An Analytical View of Recent  Lending of Credit  Decisions in Washington State by Spitzer, Hugh
An Analytical View of Recent "Lending of
Credit" Decisions in Washington State
Hugh Spitzer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sections 51 and 72 of article VIII of the Washington State
Constitution, concerning gifts or loans by the state and its sub-
divisions, have been a source of confusion to the courts and frus-
tration to the sponsors of governmental programs. One recent
Washington Supreme Court opinion referred to "[t]he presence
of inconsistent analyses or exceptions" regarding article VIII,
sections 5 and 7,3 and another noted the "erratic decisions" and
the "unjustified interpretation of the intent of the drafters" with
respect to those constitutional provisions.4
The Washington Supreme Court and commentators recently
have attempted to simplify or integrate the law concerning arti-
cle VIII, sections 5 and 7, seeking to develop a single rule or
formula for applying the two provisions-a flexible rule or
formula that would enable the court to permit a wider range of
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1. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 provides: "The credit of the state shall not, in any
manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or
corporation."
2. WASH. CONST. art VIII, § 7 provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any
money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual,
association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or
bonds of any association, company or corporation.
3. Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 264, 634 P.2d 877, 882 (1981).
4. City of Marysville v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 52, 676 P.2d 989, 990 (1984). For an
excellent, in-depth analysis of the twists, turns, and contradictions of these constitu-
tional provisions, see C. KIPPEN, ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 5 AND 7: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
PROVISIONS, THEIR IMPACT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE (1979).
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government programs that might otherwise be barred.' Never-
theless, attempts to create a single rule or set of coherent rules
for interpreting these problematical provisions are apt to fail.
The constitutional language is complex, involving numerous ele-
ments, each of which must be present for the prohibition to
apply.
Rather than a single formula governing the application of
these provisions to every fact pattern, a uniform method of
approach or analysis is required. That approach should permit
the continued existence of a variety of rules that would apply to
the different elements of the constitutional clauses in various
factual situations. The method proposed in this Article would
reduce sections 5 and 7 to their component parts, applying
appropriate rules to each part while insisting that every part be
present before either of the provisions would apply.
In addition to the problems created by attempts to find a
single formula to resolve all government "lending of credit"
cases,0 a source of confusion in recent cases interpreting sections
5 and 7 has been the tendency of the court to attempt too much
and to analyze more components of the constitutional provision
in question than are necessary to resolve the case at bar.7 This
tendency leads either to troublesome dicta that return to haunt
the court in later decisions, or to a confusion of theories result-
ing in opinions that cannot be reconciled to serve as useful
guides for future interpretations.
This Article first presents an analytic framework for assess-
ing government actions that present possible violations of article
VIII, sections 5 and 7, and then analyzes five recent cases inter-
preting those provisions: City of Marysville v. State,' City of
Seattle v. State,9 Johnson v. Johnson,1 ° Public Employment
Relations Commission v. City of Kennewick," and Housing
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 264-68, 634 P.2d 877, 882-84
(1981); Reich, Lending of Credit Reinterpreted: New Opportunities for Public 'and Pri-
vate Sector Cooperation, 19 GONZ. L. REV. - (1985).
6. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5 & 7 are known popularly as the "lending of credit"
provisions of Washington's constitution, even though the majority of cases arising under
those sections concern apparent gifts or loans of money rather than loans of credit. For
an analysis of the narrow scope of the phrase "loan of credit," see infra the discussion
accompanying notes 34-46.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 87-109.
8. 101 Wash. 2d 50, 676 P.2d 989 (1984).
9. 100 Wash. 2d 232, 668 P.2d 1266 (1983).
10. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
11. 99 Wash. 2d 832, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983).
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Finance Commission v. O'Brien.12 Other writers have provided
excellent reviews of the long history of these constitutional pro-
visions." This study, therefore, focuses on the analytic strengths
and weaknesses of a limited number of recent opinions and dem-
onstrates that those decisions made on narrow grounds-relying
on a precise analysis of the applicable provision-provide more
guidance to judges and lawyers. Washington cases decided dur-
ing the past ninety years also provide sufficient bases for judicial
approval of a wide range of government activities and programs
that many have feared would be prohibited. The key is not to
develop new exceptions to avoid the language of article VIII,
sections 5 and 7, such as the "risk of loss" theory that has
appeared in some recent cases,' 4 but rather to approach the con-
stitutional language strictly and rigorously, presuming from the
outset that proposed actions by legislative bodies are constitu-
tional and placing the burden on those who would challenge the
constitutionality of a proposed government action.' 5 The court
should then insist that each and every element of the applicable
provision be present before a prohibition will apply. This
approach, a conservative method relying principally on the text
of the constitution itself, ultimately may yield more flexibility in
practice than will new formulas that may not be easily applied
as new situations arise.
II. REDUCING THE PROVISIONS TO THEIR COMPONENT PARTS
The core of the method proposed here is, first, to divide the
language of the applicable constitutional provision into discrete
components and, then, to insist that each component be present
for the provision to apply. Article VIII, section 7 provides the
best example for this approach. Section 7 is the more detailed
12. 100 Wash. 2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983).
13. See C. KIPPEN, supra note 4, at I-1 through 1-20; Pinsky, State Constitutional
Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111
U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1963); Reich, supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Housing Finance Commission v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 495-96,
671 P.2d 247, 249-50 (1983); Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 265-68, 634 P.2d 877,
882-84 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 105-06 and 122-31.
15. See Public Employment Relations Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d
832, 836, 664 P.2d 1240, 1242 (1983) ("We have consistently held that a statute is pre-
sumed to be constitutionally valid and that the burden of overcoming that presumption
is upon the party challenging that statute."). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d
255, 258, 634 P.2d 877, 879 (1981) ("This court will sustain statutes whenever it can
conceive any set of facts which support the statute's constitutionality.").
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version of the prohibition, and the court has long held that arti-
cle VIII, section 5 should be interpreted in a fashion similar to
article VIII, section 7, although the language of the two provi-
sions clearly differs.' 6
Article VIII, section 7 may be divided for analysis as
follows:
(a) No county, city, town or other municipal corporation
shall hereafter
(b) give
(c) any money, or property,
(d) or loan
(e) its
(f) money, or credit
(g) to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation,
(h) except for the necessary support of the poor and in-
firm,
(i) or become directly or indirectly the owner
() of any stock in or bonds of
(k) any association, company or corporation.
Each of the above eleven components plays a different role
whenever a court must decide whether the prohibition applies to
a government activity. This subdivision of the provision into its
component parts is consistent with the court's frequent determi-
nation that the prohibition did not apply because a single com-
ponent was missing.' 7
16. The court consistently has construed the language of WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5
(applying to actions by the state) and WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (applying to actions by
municipal corporations) to contain similar prohibitions and exceptions, despite the clear
difference in wording between the two provisions. See, e.g., Health Care Facilities Auth.
v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980). See also C. KIPPEN, supra note
4, at I-11 through 1-18 (critical analysis of the two provisions' merger).
WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 9 has on occasion been construed similarly to the other
prohibitory sections discussed here. WASH. CONsT. art. XII, § 9 provides: "The state shall
not in any manner loan its credit, nor shall it subscribe to, or be interested in the stock
of any company, association or corporation."
17. See, e.g., Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980) (gift
component missing); Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash. 2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974) (individ-
ual, association, company, or corporation component missing); State ex rel. Graham v.
City of Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672, 497 P.2d 924 (1972) (loan of money component
absent); Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) (loan of credit
component missing), overruled, State ex rel. Washington State Fin. Comm'n v. Martin,
62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963).
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A. "Gifts"
The court's traditional approach is exemplified by its analy-
ses of whether or not a "gift" has been present. Many decisions
have held that money or property was not "given" when ade-
quate consideration supported the exchange. Component (b),
above, therefore was absent, and the constitutional prohibition
did not apply.18 A recent, typical example is Louthan v. King
County,19 in which the court approved county payments to land-
owners for the purchase of development rights to certain open
spaces and farm lands so that those properties would not be
developed. The court noted that "[flor purposes of Const. art. 8,
§ 7, a gift is a transfer of property without consideration and
with donative intent. Receipt of valuable consideration assures
that a transaction is not a gift."20 The court then held that
development rights are valuable, and because "the County
acquires a valuable right for the funds it expends, there is no
merit in the contention that the expenditure of the funds for
development rights is in reality a gift."21 Louthan is an uncom-
plicated, tightly reasoned case from a long line of cases in which
the court has found that article VIII, sections 5 or 7 were not
violated because a single component of the prohibitory lan-
guage-the gift element-was absent.22
In other cases, the court has found no gift or loan when a
public entity was carrying out a "recognized public governmen-
tal function" and the benefit to private individuals or corpora-
tions therefore was incidental to the implementation of that
basic governmental function. For example, in companion cases,23
18. See e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 32-33, 578 P.2d
1292, 1300 (1978) (sale of water by city at less than cost not a gift); State ex rel. Gorton
v. Port of Walla Walla, 81 Wash. 2d 872, 876, 505 P.2d 796, 798 (1973) (price paid by
port for land was reasonable, therefore no gift); Washington Natural Gas v. PUD No. 1,
77 Wash. 2d 94, 103, 459 P.2d 633, 638 (1969) (contracts to install underground utility
systems at district's expense not a gift); Aldrich v. State Employees' Retirement System,
49 Wash. 2d 831, 833-34, 307 P.2d 270, 271-72 (1957) (pension for public employee not a
gift); Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash. 2d 695, 698, 296 P.2d 536, 538-39 (1956)
(pensions for public employees not a gift but deferred compensation); Rands v. Clarke
County, 79 Wash. 152, 158-59, 139 P. 1090, 1092-93 (1914) (bridge built in conjunction
with Oregon county not a gift to that county).
19. 94 Wash. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980).
20. Id. at 428, 617 P.2d at 981.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510
P.2d 233 (1973); Seaboard Surety Co. v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
19851
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a car dealer challenged the restitution remedy provided by the
state's consumer protection act 4 on the theory that such restitu-
tion is a gift to those who receive recompense. In each action the
dealer also challenged the Attorney General's representation of
wronged individuals on the ground that such representation is a
gift to the persons who receive representation in remedying vio-
lations of that law. In Seaboard Surety Co. v. Ralph Williams'
Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,2" the court found that the
restitution remedy to the wronged individual was "only inciden-
tal to and in aid of the relief asked on behalf of the public."2 In
State v. Ralph Williams' Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,2"
the court expressly stated that the public provision of legal ser-
vices for misled consumers was based on the need for "protec-
tion of the public from unlawful business practices which is the
primary purpose of this action initiated by the State Attorney
General. '2 '8 The court stated further that "[alid to individuals is
not absolutely prohibited under our law but is only improper
where public money is used solely for private purposes."29
B. "Loans of Money"
The Washington Supreme Court has determined that a
"loan of money or credit" did not exist when debt in its ordinary
sense had not been created. In State ex rel. Graham v. City of
Olympia, 0 the court held that deposits of city funds in interest-
bearing accounts did not constitute a "loan" of public money,
stating:
In the interpreting of our constitution the language employed
must be taken and understood in its natural, ordinary, general,
and popular sense .... In the ordinary and popular sense, a
81 Wash. 2d 740, 540 P.2d 1139 (1973).
24. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920 (1983).
25. 81 Wash. 2d 740, 504 P.2d 1139 (1973).
26. Id. at 746, 504 P.2d at 1143.
27. 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973).
28. Id. at 277, 510 P.2d at 241. See also Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 268,
634 P.2d 877, 884 (1981) (state collection of child support payments merely a public
service to participants); State ex rel. Graham v. City of Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672, 687,
497 P.2d 924, 932 (1972) (Hale, J., concurring) (benefit to bank only incidental when
public funds placed in time deposit); Morgan v. Department of Social Sec., 14 Wash. 2d
156, 169, 127 P.2d 686, 692-93 (1942) (aid to poor is a recognized public governmental
function).
29. 82 Wash. 2d at 277, 510 P.2d at 241.
30. 80 Wash. 2d 672, 497 P.2d 924 (1972).
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loan of money or credit is at once understood to mean a trans-
action creating the customary relation of borrower and lender.
People take their money to banks, mutual savings banks, or
savings and loan associations for deposit, and the institutions
accept the money as deposits, and not as loans. It is doubtful
that anyone ever takes money to a banking institution for
deposit under the impression that the transaction is to consti-
tute a "loan," in the ordinary and popular sense of that word.3'
In a consistent decision reaching the opposite result, the
court in State ex rel. O'Connell v. PUD No. 132 struck down a
public utility district's purchase of installment sales contracts
that electrical-product vendors had made with their customers.
The court held that the article VIII, section 7 prohibition
applied because there had been an indirect "loan" in the ordi-
nary sense, that is, "an advancement of money or other personal
property to a person . . .whereby the person to whom the
advancement is made binds himself to repay it at some future
time, together with [interest]." 3 In both Graham and
O'Connell, the court focused on the language of the constitu-
tional prohibition: was there a "loan" or not? If there was a
"loan" and if the other elements of the prohibition were present,
then the transaction was barred. If there was no "loan," even the
presence of all the other necessary components still would not
trigger the prohibition.
C. "Loans of Credit"
The court's rules defining a "loan of credit" have not been
as logical and consistent as those governing the definition of
"gifts" and "loans of money." Presumably, the constitution's
framers intended a difference between lending "money" and
lending "credit," or they would not have used both terms. How-
ever, the convention journal yields no clues about the framers'
thoughts on the difference between "loans" and "credit."3" The
first and possibly the best definition equates a loan of credit
with a public guarantee of private obligations. 5 The supreme
31. Id. at 676, 497 P.2d at 926 (emphasis in original).
32. 79 Wash. 2d 237, 484 P.2d 393 (1971).
33. Id. at 241, 484 P.2d at 396 (quoting Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 384, 156
P.2d 408, 411 (1945)).
34. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at
675-84 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL].
35. Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 30-31, 211 P.2d 651, 668 (1949),
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court utilized this definition in Gruen v. State Tax Commis-
sion,36 upholding the state's imposition of a cigarette excise tax
to retire veterans' bonus bonds. The court reasoned that by
imposing the tax the government had not attempted to act as
surety for any third party; instead, the state had issued the
bonds in order to make benefit payments directly to veterans. 7
Quoting from an Iowa case, the court stated:
The section does not, in terms, purport to deal with the crea-
tion of primary indebtedness by the state for any purpose
whatsoever. The prohibition is that the state shall not lend its
credit to any other being whatever, and that it shall 'never
assume' the debts or liabilities of any other being whatso-
ever. . . . [I]s there a distinction to be observed between a
loan of credit and the power of the constituted authorities of
the state to create a primary indebtedness to subserve some
public purpose or in response to some moral obligation? 38
The supreme court in Gruen answered the Iowa court's rhetori-
cal question affirmatively. 9
A different definition of a "loan of credit" was provided in
Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of the Port of Longview,'0 in
which the court barred loans by two ports and one county to
private corporations for the financing of pollution control equip-
ment. The corporations had promised to make payments on a
schedule fixed to provide those governments with funds to pay
debt service on tax-exempt bonds issued to accomplish the ini-
tial financing.41 The transactions had been structured as leases,42
but the court had little trouble finding them to be loans of
overruled, State ex rel. Washington State Fin. Comm'n v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384
P.2d 833 (1963). See Berglund v. City of Tacoma, 70 Wash. 2d 475, 423 P.2d 922 (1967),
and the court of appeals decision in State ex rel. O'Connell v. PUD No. 1, 2 Wash. App.
366, 469 P.2d 922 (1970), for further development of the definition of "loans of credit" in
terms of suretyship. See also C. KIPPEN, supra note 4, at IV-12 through IV-23.
36. 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949).
37. Id. at 51, 211 P.2d at 679.
38. Id. at 29, 211 P.2d at 667-68 (quoting Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 472, 192
N.W. 529, 531 (1923)).
39. Id. at 30, 211 P.2d at 668.
40. 85 Wash. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1974). The opinion cited at 533 P.2d 128 con-
tains only the court's modified holding. The opinion cited at 85 Wash. 2d 216 contains
the complete opinion and the court's original holding. Parallel page citations to this case
are found at 527 P.2d 263 (1974).
41. Port of Longview, 85 Wash. 2d at 220, 527 P.2d at 265.
42. Id.
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money.43 Although no surety arrangement existed, the Port of
Longview court also characterized the arrangements as loans of
credit because the bonds were payable solely from the corpora-
tions' "lease" payments and because public money was not
pledged to repay those obligations." The court held that the
mere giving of a government's name and tax-exempt status to
the bonds lowered the cost of funds to the corporations and thus
constituted a "lending of credit. '45 The court could have reached
the Port of Longview result by a more narrowly circumscribed
analysis, finding the leases to be, in effect, loans of money. Alter-
natively, the court might have held that the grant of tax-exempt
status on the bonds was a gift supported by inadequate consid-
eration. Instead, the court broadened the definition of a "loan of
credit" to include a transaction in which no suretyship existed. 6
D. "In Aid of Any Individual, Association, Company or
Corporation"
Although the court's specific formulation of the rules defin-
ing "gifts," "loans of money," and "loans of credit" can be criti-
cized and debated, the cases discussed above illustrate that in
construing article VIII, sections 5 and 7 the court has often con-
centrated on limited elements of those constitutional prohibi-
tions. The court's rules for defining "gifts," "loans," and "credit"
necessarily have differed because those terms connote different
concepts. No single rule or formula could possibly encompass all
three concepts. Furthermore, even when one of these elements
has been found, the court must determine that the other compo-
nents of the prohibition also exist.41 For example, decisions have
held that a pure government grant or gift to another government
entity (or an Indian tribe) is not a gift "to or in aid of any indi-
vidual, association, company or corporation," and that the con-
stitutional prohibition therefore does not apply.' 8 Even when the
43. Id. at 222-23, 527 P.2d at 266.
44. Id. at 222, 527 P.2d at 266.
45. Id. at 227, 527 P.2d at 269.
46. This broadened definition of a "loan of credit" to encompass the "loan of its
name" by a municipality was reiterated in Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wash.
2d 108, 113-14, 605 P.2d 1260, 1263 (1980).
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash. 2d 64, 67, 524 P.2d 390, 393 (1974)
(state assistance to an Indian tribe); State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle,
56 Wash. 2d 86, 104, 351 P.2d 493, 505 (1960) (loan of credit to a state agency); Rands v.
Clarke County, 79 Wash. 152, 157, 139 P. 1090, 1092 (1914) (building of bridge in con-
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court has found a "gift" or "loan" to a private individual, how-
ever, the exception "for the necessary support of the poor and
infirm" may permit the otherwise barred transaction.49
The analytical reduction of article VIII, sections 5 and 7
into discrete components has a long history.50 With some excep-
tions, whenever the court has rigorously insisted that each ele-
ment of the prohibition be present and has been careful in its
definition of terms such as "gift," 51 "loan of money, '' 52 "loan of
credit, '53 "stock in or bonds of,"54 and "individual, association,
company or corporation," 55 the cases appear to have been easier
to decide and much easier to apply. Furthermore, as the next
section shows, if the court adheres to the traditional approach of
analyzing the language of the constitution and drawing conclu-
sions about the prohibitions in article VIII, sections 5 and 7
principally from the language itself, the court will have signifi-
cant flexibility in its decisions on proposed government projects
and actions.
III. FIVE RECENT CASES
This section examines in detail five recent cases involving
article VIII, sections 5 and 7, in order to demonstrate that the
more successful opinions focus on the language of the applicable
constitutional provision itself and insist that each element of the
junction with Oregon county); Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9, 11, 45 P. 645, 646
(1896) (condemnation of land for ship canal to be built by the state and the federal
government).
49. See, e.g., Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260
(1980) (bond proceeds for the benefit of health care facilities contributed aid to the
infirm); Morgan v. Department of Social Sec., 14 Wash. 2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942) (old-
age pension held to aid the poor and infirm); State ex rel. Schmidt v. Sullivan, 190
Wash. 600, 69 P.2d 828 (1937) (funds for indigent blind persons within poor and infirm
exception).
50. See supra note 17 for cases in which the court found no violation on the basis
that one discrete component of the applicable constitutional provision was absent. See
also infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of City of Marysville v.
State, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 676 P.2d 989 (1984), in which the court analyzed a governmental
action that was challenged under WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7, by dividing the constitu-
tional provision into its component parts.
51. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
54. See State ex rel. Graham v. City of Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672, 683-85, 497 P.2d
924, 930-31 (1972) (court found that the deposit of public funds into an interest-bearing
account in a savings and loan association did not violate the ban on municipal ownership
of corporate stock). See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
55. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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prohibition be present. The cases that attempt to discuss more
elements of the prohibition than are necessary to solve the spe-
cific situation before the court, or that contain unnecessary
dicta, tend to be confusing and provide only limited guidance for
future decisions by government agencies and the courts.
A. City of Marysville v. State
In City of Marysville v. State,5" the city of Marysville, a
participating employer in the Public Employees' Retirement
System (PERS), had purchased a privately owned golf course in
1971.57 Three employees of the golf course at the time of
purchase continued to work at the course, now as city employees
and members of PERS.58 The state administrators of PERS
determined that under state law59 the three employees were each
entitled to a credit for their previous service when the course
had been private.60 PERS billed the city for a contribution to
the retirement system based on the employees' length of service,
including service at the facility when it was privately owned. 1
The city refused to pay into PERS for the time corresponding to
the employees' private employment, claiming that such payment
would be an unconstitutional gift to private individuals.2
The court's opinion was concise and tightly reasoned. First,
it held that a payment by the city of Marysville to the state
PERS system was not a gift "to or in aid of any individual, asso-
ciation, company or corporation" prohibited by the constitution,
under the long-standing rule that "the plain terms of Article 8,
Section 7 do not encompass payments between public enti-
ties. '6 3 Next, the opinion focused on the extra years of credit
that the employees received through the PERS system for work
performed for the private employer.6 The decision noted:
[A] pension granted to a public employee is not a gratuity but
is deferred compensation for services rendered .... The only
question, then, is whether the fact that the amount of contri-
56. 101 Wash. 2d 50, 676 P.2d 989 (1984).
57. Id. at 51, 676 P.2d at 990.
58. Id.
59. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.40.160(2) (1972).
60. Marysville, 101 Wash. 2d at 51, 676 P.2d at 990.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 56, 676 P.2d at 992-93.
64. Id. at 56-57, 676 P.2d at 993.
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butions is calculated with reference to how long the subject
employees worked for [the golf course] before it was purchased
by the City makes the contributions "gratuitous" because such
services had already been rendered. 5
The court easily disposed of this attack by quoting from the
statutory language providing for such credits in order to retain
trained personnel." The court then stated:
[I]t is obvious that the Legislature intended such credit to be a
constitutional inducement to experienced private employees to
stay on the job after their companies were acquired by public
entities rather than an unconstitutional gratuity to such
employees. The subject employees provided ample considera-
tion for the pension benefits when they remained at [the golf
course] after its acquisition by the City. 7
Thus, in Marysville, the court applied two traditional rules:
first, a "gift" from one public entity to another is not a gift "to
or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation"
and, second, no "gift" exists when adequate consideration sup-
ports the exchange.
In a concurring opinion, the late Justice Rosellini correctly
noted that the majority opinion had included an unnecessary
historical review of the framers' purposes for including article
VIII, sections 5 and 7 in the constitution. 8 He asserted that the
majority's discussion of nineteenth-century fears of public "risk
of loss" from investment in private business schemes was not
needed because a decision in favor of PERS could have been
reached solely on the basis of whether or not there had been
adequate consideration for the grant of service credit to the
employees. 9 Nonetheless, despite its short historical voyage to
the constitutional convention, Marysville remains a straightfor-
ward, limited opinion that focused on the language of the prohi-
bition itself, found some of the necessary elements missing, and
held, therefore, that the prohibition did not apply.
65. Id. at 57, 676 P.2d at 993.
66. Id. at 58, 676 P.2d at 993.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 59-62, 676 P.2d at 994-96 (Rosellini, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 59-60, 676 P.2d at 994 (Rosellini, J., concurring).
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B. City of Seattle v. State
City of Seattle v. State,7 0 another recent case construing
article VIII, section 7, concerned a Seattle ordinance 1 that
authorized the partial public financing of election campaigns for
city office when the candidates voluntarily agreed to limit the
amount of private contributions to their races.7 2 Although the
Seattle court did not explicitly analyze the language of article
VIII, section 7, the decision implicitly followed three traditional
rules in finding the constitutional prohibition inapplicable.
First, the court noted the city's recognition of political can-
didates' dependency on campaign contributions from private
interests and the danger of electing public officials beholden to
narrow interest groups.74 Without expressly referring to the
traditional rule that no gift is present if there is adequate con-
sideration, the opinion fully described the elements of the
mutual agreement by which a candidate would receive public
campaign funds in return for limiting his or her acceptance of
private political donations. 75 The court observed that "if a can-
didate agrees to the spending limit, public funds will displace
rather than merely supplement private funds, thus reducing the
candidate's reliance on private contributions. 76
Next, the court reasoned:
[P]ublic campaign funds may be used only for direct campaign
purposes. Such funds never leave the public arena; they never
go into the private pockets of the candidate for his own per-
sonal purposes. The candidate holds the funds in a fiduciary
capacity and can spend only to further the objectives of the
ordinance. When the campaign is over, all public funds not
spent for those limited purposes must be returned to the
City77
In other words, the court held that there was no public gift of
money to any individual because the funds never left the public
sector. The city's campaign contributions were spent for public
purposes, and the candidates expended those funds solely as
70. 100 Wash. 2d 232, 668 P.2d 1266 (1983).
71. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 2.04.400-.480 (1980).
72. Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d at 235, 668 P.2d at 1267.
73. Id. at 235, 668 P.2d at 1267.
74. Id. at 236, 668 P.2d at 1268.
75. Id. at 239-40, 668 P.2d at 1270.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 240-41, 668 P.2d at 1270 (emphasis in original).
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"trustees" of the public purse. The money never became private
in character; thus the constitutional bar against gifts "in aid of
any individual" was not triggered and the prohibition did not
apply.
This creative twist on a traditional rule was in essence the
reverse of a principle laid out in Health Care Facilities Author-
ity v. Spellman,75 in which the court held that the loan of pro-
ceeds of bonds issued by a public entity to finance capital acqui-
sitions by religiously based hospitals was not a violation of the
constitution's ban on expenditure of public money for religious
purposes. In that case, the money involved had flowed from
the private bond market through accounts in a private trustee
bank to the private, nonprofit hospital, and thus had never
become public in character."0 In Health Care Facilities Author-
ity v. Spellman, the court held that the prohibition against use
of public funds for religious purposes was inapplicable because
the money never became public,81 while in City of Seattle v.
State, the court found that the ban on use of public money for
private purposes had not been violated because the funds
involved retained their public character throughout the transac-
tion and hence were never used in aid of private individuals.2"
The third basis for the court's holding in City of Seattle v.
State was related to the rule that no gift of a municipality's
money occurs when funds are expended for a recognized govern-
mental function.83 The court phrased this rule in terms of "enti-
tlements," which it defined as "a form of assistance provided to
the public, or a segment of the public, as cash or services, in
carrying out a program to further an overriding public purpose
or satisfy a moral obligation. '84 The opinion compared Seattle's
public campaign contributions to government-provided day care
services, vaccinations to control disease, fare-free bus zones to
reduce traffic congestion, crime victim compensation, and sev-
eral other forms of payments made by the government in carry-
78. 96 Wash. 2d 68, 633 P.2d 866 (1981).
79. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 states, in part: "No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the sup-
port of any religious establishment."
80. 96 Wash. 2d at 72-75, 633 P.2d at 868-69.
81. Id. at 72-76, 633 P.2d at 868-70.
82. Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d at 240-41, 668 P.2d at 1270.
83. Id. at 240, 633 P.2d at 1270.
84. Id. at 241, 633 P.2d at 1270.
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ing out its fundamental purposes." To the extent that private
candidates might benefit from public expenditures on their cam-
paigns, those benefits were found to be incidental to the public
benefit of preserving the electoral process from control by spe-
cial interest groups. 6
The court in City of Seattle v. State need not have relied
on three separate arguments to determine that the article VIII,
section 7 prohibition was inapplicable. The lack of any one of
the elements of the prohibition would have sufficed to block
application of the provision. Nevertheless, each of the court's
rationales was relevant to the case at bar. The court's develop-
ment of each rationale will be useful to judges, lawyers, and pub-
lic officials in future determinations of whether specific govern-
ment programs are in accord with the constitution.
C. Johnson v. Johnson
Unlike the two cases discussed above, Johnson v. Johnson8 7
could have been determined swiftly on the ground that a single
element of the prohibition was lacking. Instead, the opinion
attempted too much, inserting many more theories than were
necessary to decide the case. In Johnson, the court reviewed a
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) program
established by statute88 to facilitate the collection of past-due
child support for children not receiving public assistance.8" Mr.
and Mrs. Johnson had been divorced, with Mrs. Johnson retain-
ing custody of their youngest child. Mr. Johnson was ordered
to pay child support, and when he failed to do so, DSHS pro-
ceeded with a statutory action to collect the money owed Mrs.
Johnson.' Mr. Johnson's suit alleged, among other things, that
state action to collect the private debt on behalf of a nonindi-
gent person violated article VIII, section 5 because it was a gift
of public money for a private purpose.2
The plurality opinion first correctly observed that the bur-
85. Id. at 241-42, 633 P.2d at 1271.
86. Id. at 242-44, 633 P.2d at 1271-72.
87. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
88. The child support collection program involved in Johnson v. Johnson had been
authorized by WASH. REV. CODE § 74.20.040 (1983).
89. 96 Wash. 2d at 257, 634 P.2d at 878.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 258, 634 P.2d at 879.
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den was on Mr. Johnson to demonstrate that the statute
involved was constitutionally invalid, stating that the court
would sustain the statute if it could conceive "any set of facts
which support the statute's constitutionality."93 The opinion
then reasoned, among other things, that governmental enforce-
ment of a child's fundamental right to support constituted a"recognized public function," and thus no gift to an individual
was involved.94
The opinion easily could have ended at this point, once the
court had found the lack of any public gift to a private person.
Nevertheless, in both the plurality95 and concurring" opinions,
the court launched into a confusing history of article VIII, sec-
tions 5 and 7 and attempted to draw in several theories applica-
ble to other elements of the prohibition but not specifically rele-
vant to the matter at hand.
For example, the court stated that the public benefit from
state collection of child support payments was "consideration"
for the funds expended.9 7 This reference to the "consideration"
rule was unnecessary and baffling. As noted above, 98 the concept
of consideration is relevant only when a transfer from the gov-
ernment to a private person would otherwise be a gift. When the
public agency is carrying out a recognized governmental function
and the benefit to an individual is merely incidental, no consid-
eration is required because no transfer has occurred that might
be viewed as a gift.99
Indeed, if as stated in Johnson, the "public benefit achieved
from such activities is the 'consideration' for the funds
expended," ' logically any public benefit from what would oth-
erwise be a gift to a private individual or entity would be consti-
tutionally acceptable. For example, increased employment from
government investment in the stock of local high-technology cor-
porations might be held adequate "public benefit" and "consid-
eration" for what would otherwise be barred. Similarly, munici-
pal investment in the stocks and bonds of private railroads
93. Id.
94. Id. at 263-64, 634 P.2d at 882.
95. Id. at 264-67, 634 P.2d at 882-84.
96. Id. at 268-73, 634 P.2d at 884-87 (Dore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
97. Id. at 262, 634 P.2d at 881.
98. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
99. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at 263-64, 634 P.2d at 882.
100. Id. at 262, 634 P.2d at 881.
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logically could provide "consideration" under such an analysis
because economic benefits to the state could result. Yet, the
framers meant to bar this very form of government investment
regardless of the resulting public benefit.10' Thus, the insertion
of the "consideration" theory into the court's opinion in John-
son was both unnecessary for the decision and potentially con-
fusing to those attempting to apply it.
Similarly, the court discussed the article VIII, section 5
exemption of activities in support of the poor and infirm.'0 2 Yet
the facts of the case made it clear that Mrs. Johnson and her
daughter were neither poor nor infirm.1 0 3 Thus, the reference to
the line of cases concerning aid to low-income and ill citizens
served only to confuse matters further.
The court also complicated its plurality opinion by includ-
ing a lengthy examination of what it called the "risk of loss"
approach to article VIII, sections 5 and 7.1°4 The opinion noted
that the framers included these provisions to avoid the risk of
losing public money on privately owned or controlled ventures
and stated that, because no public funds were at risk in the
child support program, article VIII, section 5 was not violated.' 5
In this discussion, the opinion clearly set up a straw man. When
governments spend money for accepted public purposes, such as
financial aid to children, day care services, vaccinations, free bus
zones, or assistance to victims of crime, the concept of "risk" of
public funds is inapposite. Although the court's opinion in John-
son was a scholarly attempt to review the wide and apparently
conflicting range of principles concerning article VIII, sections 5
and 7, the inclusion of so many different rules and the effort to
apply them all to the instant case served more to confuse than
to clarify the law. Perhaps because of the inclusion of so many
rules, the plurality opinion received the support of only three
justices. 106 Three others concurred in the result,'17 two concurred
in part and dissented in part,' 8 and one justice dissented.'0 9 One
101. See JOURNAL, supra note 34, at 675, 679-84.
102. 96 Wash. 2d at 262, 634 P.2d at 881.
103. Id. at 257, 634 P.2d at 879.
104. Id. at 265-68, 634 P.2d at 882-84. See also supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
105. Id. at 267-68, 634 P.2d at 884.
106. Justice Utter wrote the opinion, with Justices Dolliver and Williams
concurring.
107. Justices Stafford, Hicks, and Dimmick.
108. Justices Dore and Rosellini.
109. Chief Justice Brachtenbach.
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suspects that if the opinion had been restricted to a discussion
of the "recognized public governmental function" of child sup-
port enforcement, it would have garnered more general support
among the members of the court and would also have been more
useful to lawyers, courts, and government officials.
D. Public Employment Relations Commission v. City of
Kennewick
Public Employment Relations Commission v. City of Ken-
newick" followed the principal rules applied in Johnson,"'
without including much more than was necessary to decide the
case. Kennewick involved two janitors who worked at Ken-
newick City Hall under a collective bargaining agreement
between the city and the International Union of Operating Engi-
neers." 2 When one of the janitorial positions became vacant, the
city filled it by subcontracting that portion of the work to a pri-
vate firm."' The city manager refused to reverse the action after
a union complaint." 4 The labor organization then filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the Public Employment Relations
Commission, as provided in the Public Employees' Collective
Bargaining Act."' The commission ruled in favor of the union,
but the city refused to comply with the commission's order on
the ground, among others, that the enforcement of the order
would constitute a use of public funds for the labor organiza-
tion's private benefit in violation of article VIII, section 5."'1
In a unanimous opinion, the court neatly disposed of the
city's argument, first ruling that the party challenging the rele-
vant statute had the burden of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality' 1 7 and then finding that the legislative goal of
peaceful employment relations was a "recognized public govern-
mental function.""" The court noted, as it had in previous opin-
ions, that "[p]rivate parties may indeed benefit incidentally as a
result of the exercise of that important function; however, as
110. 99 Wash. 2d 832, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 87-109.
112. Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d at 834, 664 P.2d at 1241.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.170 (1983).
116. Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d at 835, 664 P.2d at 1241.
117. Id. at 836, 664 P.2d at 1242.
118. Id. at 837-38, 664 P.2d at 1243.
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long as the private benefit is incidental to the public purpose
served, the legislation is not unconstitutional. '" 119 The court
referred in passing to the public governmental function as "con-
sideration" for the state's expenditure12 ° and also recited the
concept from Johnson that the government activity did not sub-
ject any of the state's assets to risk of loss.' 2' Neither of these
two latter references was necessary to the court's decision, but
they were brief and did not detract significantly from an other-
wise simple and straightforward analysis that focused on
whether a gift of public funds had been made for private benefit.
The clarity and simplicity of the Kennewick opinion may well
have been a factor in garnering the court's full support, and the
tight reasoning of the opinion made it easy for judges, lawyers,
and government officials to understand and apply in future
matters.
E. State Housing Finance Commission v. O'Brien
The final case examined here is State Housing Finance
Commission v. O'Brien,' in which the Washington Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statutorily authorized
program under which a state agency issued nonrecourse revenue
bonds and loaned the proceeds of those bonds to first-time,
moderate-income home buyers and to the builders or purchasers
of mixed-income rental housing projects.'23
The majority first related in detail the legislature's findings
concerning the impact of a severe economic recession on the
ability of low- and middle-income families to afford housing and
the impact of that recession on the state's economy in general.'24
The court stated that "[t]he adequacy of private housing and
the health of the state's economy have traditionally been con-
cerns of state government"' 25 and asserted that any private sec-
tor benefits from the commission's program should be seen
either as incidental benefits or as compensation for necessary
work performed. 2 6 However, the core of the opinion addressed
119. Id. at 838, 664 P.2d at 1243.
120. Id. at 837-38, 664 P.2d at 1243.
121. Id. at 839, 664 P.2d at 1243.
122. 100 Wash. 2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983).
123. Id. at 493, 671 P.2d at 248-49.
124. Id. at 493, 671 P.2d at 248.
125. Id. at 496, 671 P.2d at 250.
126. Id. at 496-97, 671 P.2d at 250-51.
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the issue whether the State Housing Finance Commission's loan
programs posed any "risk of loss" to the state. 2 ' The court
recited the framers' desire to protect the public purse from
investment in uncertain private ventures 118 and stated that the
risk of loss approach required the court to evaluate whether the
program had "safeguards absent in the schemes of the nine-
teenth century."" 9 The court then found that the risk of loss to
the public was minimal because of extensive safeguards that the
court said were built into the legislation governing the commis-
sion: program funds were derived entirely from the private bond
market rather than from state appropriation; the funds never
entered the state treasury but were held in special trust
accounts; the bonds, although issued in the commission's name,
contained a recital that they were not state obligations.130 Fur-
thermore, potential impact on the state's credit rating was mini-
mized by limits on the total permitted volume of commission
bonds and by the fact that the commission had sought a court
decision on the relevant statute's constitutionality to avoid a
later challenge to the validity of the bonds.13 1
O'Brien was decided on a five-to-four vote.1' 2 The dissent
relied principally on language in Port of Longview v. Taxpayers
of the Port of Longview133 and Washington Health Care Facili-
ties Authority v. Ray134 to the effect that the use of the state's
name and ability to confer tax-exempt status on bonds was a
"lending of credit" under article VIII, section 5.13' The minority
also distinguished Johnson v. Johnson36 and Public Employ-
127. Id. at 498-500, 671 P.2d at 251-52.
128. Id. at 494, 671 P.2d at 249.
129. Id. at 495, 671 P.2d at 250.
130. Id. at 498, 671 P.2d at 251.
131. Id. at 498-99, 671 P.2d at 251-52. The court referred specifically to Chemical
Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983), and
to the negative impact on the state's credit rating of successful challenges to the validity
of bonds issued by public entities. The court reasoned that the risk of loss to the state
from lending its name to the commission's bonds had been minimized by the fact that
the validity of the bond issue was tested before the obligations were sold in the financial
markets.
132. Chief Justice Williams and Justices Utter, Dolliver, and Pearson concurred
with Justice Dimmick's opinion, while Justices Stafford, Brachtenbach, and Dore con-
curred with Justice Rosellini's dissenting opinion.
133. 85 Wash. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1974).
134. 93 Wash. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980).
135. 100 Wash. 2d at 502-05, 671 P.2d at 253-55 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
136. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
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ment Relations Commission v. City of Kennewick137 by stating
that those cases involved expenditures for recognized govern-
mental services and functions, and that the subsidization of pri-
vate home buyers and developers was not a recognized function
of the state.1 8
Yet, the dissent in O'Brien did not focus on what is possibly
the weakest part of the majority's logic: the assertion that,
because the framers were concerned about risks of loss to the
state, there was no loan of money or credit if it could be shown
that no risk of loss was present. 3 ' This reasoning has a serious
flaw: no matter how many safeguards are present to minimize
the risk of loss to the state, a loan, albeit a very safe one, can
still exist.
If the existence of strong safeguards against losses to the
state mean that no loan or gift has occurred, then might not the
state lend tax funds or general obligation bond proceeds to pri-
vate individuals and corporations whenever those loans are fully
guaranteed by the federal government or by insurance compa-
nies whose claims-paying ability is unassailable? If a wholly
secure loan is not a "loan" by the court's reasoning, what would
keep the state or municipalities from lending tax funds to pri-
vate railroads when there are: (1) legislative findings of the need
to aid the transportation industry; (2) safeguards over the use of
the money loaned; (3) federal guarantees, private insurance, or
letters of credit from strong financial institutions to secure
repayment of the loans; and (4) test cases to validate the pro-
posed transaction? In other words, the central logic of the
majority opinion in O'Brien could lead to the validation of
transactions that clearly were not meant to be permitted either
by the framers or by today's court. This weakness in the major-
ity opinion not only may have caused a sharply divided court,
but also produced an opinion that will make analysis of future
legislative programs difficult.
In O'Brien, the court could have applied a different analyti-
cal approach based purely on a conservative and demanding
reading of article VIII, sections 5 and 7. Such an approach would
have found that one or more of the elements of the constitu-
tional provision were absent when applied to the housing finance
137. 99 Wash. 2d 832, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983).
138. See generally supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
139. 100 Wash. 2d at 500-07, 671 P.2d at 252-56 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
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programs, and that the prohibitions thus would not apply.
The court could have determined that the money or credit
being loaned in connection with the State Housing Finance
Commission's program was not, in the language of article VIII,
section 5, the money or credit "of the state"-and in the lan-
guage of article VIII, section 7, not "its money, or credit." The
State Housing Finance Commission's legislation had been care-
fully drafted to conform to the court's rules, set forth in Health
Care Facilities Authority v. Spellman,14 ° for determining when
bond proceeds loaned to a private religious institution consti-
tuted "public money." Although the constitutional provision
involved in Health Care Facilities Authority v. Spellman was
different from that in O'Brien, the O'Brien opinion could have
found them sufficiently similar to apply the same rules when: (1)
no money came from the public treasury for the loans; (2) the
bond proceeds never entered the public treasury; (3) repayment
of the bonds did not pass through the public treasury; (4) the
bonds were not a debt of the state; and (5) money for the loans
was not acquired from or for the taxpayers at large; there was no
lending of "public money" and therefore the applicable constitu-
tional provision did not bar the transaction. 141 Under this analy-
sis, O'Brien would have been distinguishable from Port of Long-
view 142 because the bond proceeds involved in Port of Longview
were placed in the public treasury, and debt service on those
bonds was provided by lease payments paid by private entities
into the public treasury.143
If the court had held in O'Brien that the money or credit
being loaned was not the money or credit of the state, then the
only remaining significant action that the state was taking was
giving tax-exempt status to the bonds providing the money
loaned. The court observed in Port of Longview and in Health
Care Facilities Authority v. Ray that a tax exemption is valua-
ble because it reduces borrowing costs. 14 4 In the same opinions,
however, the court inaccurately described the government action
making the bonds tax-exempt as a "lending of credit," despite
140. 96 Wash. 2d 68, 72-75, 633 P.2d 866, 868-69 (1981).
141. Id. at 72-76, 633 P.2d at 868-70. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
142. 85 Wash. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1974). See supra note 40 for an explanation of
the parallel citations to this case.
143. Id. at 222, 527 P.2d at 266.
144. Id. at 230-31, 527 P.2d at 271; Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d
108, 114, 605 P.2d 1260, 1263 (1980).
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the fact that the government was not serving as a surety on the
loans-the action traditionally defined as a loan of credit.'45
Instead, the government's action conferring tax-exempt sta-
tus on the bonds should be analyzed as a possible gift of some-
thing of value, which would be barred by article VIII, sections 5
or 7 were there not adequate consideration in return. In the
State Housing Finance Commission's programs, for example, the
provision of safe and sanitary housing for first-time home buyers
and low-income persons, in compliance with the commission's
strict guidelines, would provide sufficient consideration for the
state's transfer of low-interest financing to the housing industry.
Hence, there would be an inducement to the mortgage lending
and construction industries to take actions that they would not
take were it not for the lower interest rates provided on the
loans. This is in marked contrast to the circumstances in Port of
Longview, in which the pollution control facilities funded by the
government agencies were an existing obligation that the private
companies were required to construct regardless of the agencies'
granting of low-cost funds through the use of tax-exempt
bonds. 46
The strict public controls over the use of the State Housing
Finance Commission's bond proceeds should not have been
interpreted in O'Brien to mean that no gift or loan existed, but
rather that there existed clearly delineated elements of a bargain
that the users of the funds had to fulfill as part of the considera-
tion for obtaining low-interest money for housing purposes.
Indeed, the lengthy "risk of loss" rationale in the majority's
opinion should have been used only to measure the value of the
government's side of the bargain; if the state had little risk of
loss, it needed less consideration for its grant of tax-exempt sta-
tus on the bonds. "Risk of loss" should be seen primarily as an
historical description of the original policy basis for article VIII,
sections 5 and 7, and not as a substitute for the text of the
prohibitions themselves. That text specifies the framers' solution
to a perceived danger. Although historical inquiry is useful in
determining the meaning of a constitutional phrase, such inquiry
should not justify changes of meaning from one thing to its
opposite when the words are relatively clear. The term "loan"
has not changed substantially in the past century, and the State
145. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
146. Port of Longview, 85 Wash. 2d at 218, 527 P.2d at 264.
1985] 217
218 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Housing Finance Commission clearly made loans. The key is
that the loans were not of state money or credit. If there had
been loans of state money or credit, the framers would have
intended to bar them regardless of the degree of risk.
An alternative and equally defensible rationale that the
court could have applied in O'Brien is simply that the provision
of housing is a "recognized public governmental function" and
that government loans to aid in the provision of housing for citi-
zens are not fundamentally different from day care services, vac-
cinations, fare-free bus zones, crime victim compensation, or
public support of electoral campaigns, all of which the court in
City of Seattle v. State suggested were permissible. 14 7 Benefits
accruing to individuals or businesses in connection with the
commission's housing finance programs thus would be viewed as
incidental to the underlying governmental function of providing
decent, safe, and sanitary housing, a function that the legislature
specifically found to be an obligation of the state when it
enacted the commission's enabling legislation. 4 8 This approach,
relying solely on the "recognized public governmental function"
rule to determine the absence of a gift or loan, might not have
swayed the four dissenting members of the court. Nevertheless,
if the majority had chosen to rely on that rule, its opinion would
have been simpler, more straightforward, and easier to apply to
future legislative programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
When viewed as a whole, the Washington Supreme Court's
opinions construing article VIII, sections 5 and 7 are neither as
inconsistent nor as erratic as some have contended. 49 Many of
the opinions are logical and easy to apply to future questions
because they focus simply on one or another of the elements of
the constitutional provision and reject application of the provi-
sion when a single element is missing. Article VIII, sections 5
147. 100 Wash. 2d 232, 241-42, 668 P.2d 1266, 1271 (1983). See supra notes 83-86
and accompanying text.
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.180.010 (1983).
149. See, e.g., City of Marysville v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 52, 676 P.2d 989, 990
(1984) ("In [an earlier case], a plurality of this court examined our earlier erratic deci-
sions and concluded most of them were an unjustified interpretation of the intent of the
drafters of article 8, sections 5 and 7 of the constitution."); Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash.
2d 255, 264, 634 P.2d 877, 882 (1981) ("The presence of inconsistent analyses or excep-
tions suggest [sic] the approach may have outlived its relevance or was improvidently
fashioned.").
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and 7 are occasionally difficult to apply because there are so
many components involved. It is not always easy to discern
which element-and therefore which rule or rules-should be
the subject of analysis. Nevertheless, if the courts and lawyers
critically analyze each proposed governmental action and
methodically determine whether each and every element of the
applicable constitutional prohibition is present, relatively few
government proposals will be found to violate article VIII, sec-
tion 5 or 7.
Existing rules governing interpretation of the elements of
article VIII, sections 5 and 7 provide ample bases for judicial
findings that no loans or gifts exist, that there is adequate con-
sideration, that a loan or gift is not in aid of a private party, or
that the money or credit involved is not public in nature. The
rules concerning each of these elements are easy to apply when
one first specifies which element should be analyzed. Inconsis-
tent analyses or erratic decisions indeed have occurred from
time to time, but principally because the court attempted to
apply more rules than were necessary, or because opinions
included unnecessary dicta to distinguish cases or problems that
were not relevant. The best approach to article VIII, sections 5
and 7, and the one that ultimately will yield the most flexibility
in determining the constitutionality of legislative programs, is
the more conservative approach of reducing the textual provi-
sions to their component parts, using the straightest and nar-
rowest path necessary to decide the case before the court, and
avoiding discussion of those factors unnecessary for reaching a
decision.
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